APR 27 1942

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

PERIODICAL ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIV. OF MICH.

VOL. XXXIX, NO. 9: APRIL 23, 1942

CONTENTS

On the Unity and Ethical Neutrality of Science: HORACE S. FRIES 225

Intrinsic Good: BARNETT SAVERY 234

Book Review 245

CHARLES HARTSHORNE, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism:* JUSTUS BUCHLER.

Book Notes 247

IMMANUEL KANT, *Filosofía de la historia.*

GLENN NEGLEY, *The Organization of Knowledge.*

Other New Books and Journals 249

Notes and News 250

PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY

BY THE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND WENDELL T. BUSH

EDITORS: Herbert W. Schneider, John H. Randall, Jr., Ernest Nagel.

BOOK EDITORS (1939–1942): George Boas, Justus Buchler, Harry T. Costello, John D. Goheen, Albert Hofstadter, Otto F. Kraushaar, Paul O. Kristeller, Kenneth P. Landon, Harold A. Larrabee, Donald S. Mackay, V. J. McGill, Ernest A. Moody, P. Romanell, George C. Seward, Jeffery Smith, Norman L. Torrey.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., and published fortnightly at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial Office: 515 West 116th St., New York, N. Y. President, Herbert W. Schneider; Vice President, John H. Randall, Jr.; Treasurer, Frederick A. Dewey; Secretary, Iris Wilder Dean.

Communications to the editors should be addressed, Columbia University, New York. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Prince and Lemon Streets, Lancaster, Pa., or 515 West 116th Street, New York. The annual subscription price (twenty-six numbers) is $4.00. The price of single numbers is 20 cents, except the annual bibliography number, the price of which is $1.00. Advertising rates will be forwarded on application.

Entered as second class matter, March 18, 1921, at the Post Office at Lancaster, Pa., under Act of Congress of March 3, 1879.

Recent texts

THE QUEST FOR WISDOM
GARNETT

A brief readable introduction to the major issues and problems of philosophy. Dr. Garnett unifies his treatment around the theme of man's quest for wisdom—*aesthetic* wisdom, wisdom in *conduct*, wisdom in *religion*.

322 pages *crown 8vo* *$2.00*

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
MARTIN, CLARK, CLARKE, RUDDICK

"Short rather than long: thorough in performance rather than large in undertaking." This treatment gives the student a clear idea of the processes and idioms of reasoning which underlie the schools of thought. The major figures stand out as is their due, but the authors have written the story of philosophy as a process of continuous development throughout the centuries.

546 pages *8vo* *$3.25*

PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE
RAMSPERGER

A concise account of important philosophical interpretations of science with sufficient scientific exposition to give the arguments adequate illustration. Many of the topics dealt with are matters of current philosophical controversy and the arguments presented are real contributions toward their solution.

304 pages *crown 8vo* *$2.25*

WRITE FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

F. S. CROFTS & CO. 101 Fifth Avenue, New York

VOLUME XXXIX, No. 9 APRIL 23, 1942

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ON THE UNITY AND ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF SCIENCE

I

THE Movement for the Unity of Science seems to recognize the dangers and limitations involved in over-systematization of the abstract materials of the sciences. Accordingly Otto Neurath tells us that the maximum of scientific coördination possible is an encyclopedia of unified science.[1] On the other hand we are told, "Scientists may now build up systematical bridges from science to science, *analyzing concepts* which are used in different sciences, considering all questions dealing with classification, order, etc." And although "we cannot anticipate a 'final axiomatization'" of science, yet axiomatization "seems to give an opportunity to make the use of fundamental terms more precise and to *prepare* the combination of different sciences."[2] Again, "The new *Encyclopedia* so aims to integrate the scientific disciplines, so to unify them, so to dovetail them together, that advances in one will bring about advances in the others."[3]

It seems to me that a more significant unification of science is possible than encyclopedism, important as this is. But the proposal to be made involves a criticism of some *tendencies* of the Movement, illustrated in the quotations above, which it seems to me must be corrected if this more significant unification is to be attained. It is obvious that in so far as certain aspects of the Movement are exempt from these tendencies, the critical remarks do not apply. But even were they directed entirely against a straw man they would serve to clarify by contrast the positive alternative.

The tendencies of the Movement to be criticized may be summarized as the setting out from a study of the abstract material of the sciences.

In some experimental science, chiefly physics, the *abstract* material has itself become highly complex *without losing operational*

[1] Otto Neurath, "Unified Science as Encyclopedic Integration," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 20.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19 (my italics).

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

significance in the world of events. Also it has developed problems within its own subject-matter of mathematical signs. But we should remember that the development of this subject-matter arises out of, and is tested by, experimental procedures in the *concrete* material. Since the abstractions remain in touch with the latter, they are continuously reconstructed in view of the actual experimental necessities and conveniences of the science. If we take this distinction between the abstract and concrete materials seriously, it is easy to see that the symbolic unification of the former is not, *ipso facto,* the unification of the sciences.

Now any attempt to unify the sciences which begins with their abstract material (the language of science) is bound to become separated to some extent from the concrete material in which the criteria of prediction and control function. To the extent of such separation, the activity will be carried on without concrete experimental tests. Thus it will fall into what may be called the *fallacy of separated abstraction.* This fact is suggested by a simple analogy. Bio-chemistry doubtless serves toward the unification of biology and chemistry. But it is an experimental science. It does not proceed simply among the abstractions of the two sciences. The fallacy is also suggested by the simple warning that the attempt to "unify" the sciences by non-experimental procedures does not appear offhand to be particularly scientific. Let us examine this claim.

In order to obtain a basis for transformations or equivalences among the different abstract materials of the various sciences, further abstractions from this material must be made by means of a systematic development of signs. "Semiotic" is the term which Mr. Charles W. Morris uses for this study of the language of science.[4]

Now in general the specialists in semiotic are not scientists working *in* the concrete problematic material of the sciences involved. There is no actual functioning connection between it and semiotic. But as Dewey has clearly shown (e.g., in his *Logic*), the significant meanings of terms used in the conduct of scientific inquiry are determined in part by the concrete problematic situation in hand, and by the sensitivity of the inquirer to the situation. Thus there lurks a grave danger in semiotic. For it involves (at present at least) a divorce between (*a*) the study of signs and their meanings

[4] At least semiotic is the science of signs, while the "syntactical" study of scientific language abstracts from the objects designated by the signs. That Mr. Morris takes the Movement as beginning from the abstract end of the sciences would seem to be indicated by his explanation of syntactical "abstraction" and by the following statement about syntactics: "The degree of unity or disunity of science reveals itself here in the degree to which the sciences have or can have a common linguistic structure," "Scientific Empiricism," *ibid.,* pp. 70, 69.

and (*b*) the study of the basic situation which requires these complex sign systems for use as instruments for the resolution of the concrete difficulty.

Now this separation will serve to multiply pseudo-problems. Signs and the relation between signs and their objects can doubtless be studied in abstraction from the actual situations in which the signs and their objects function. But within this new study new problems will arise and find their solutions. Now these have been, or will be, solved in abstraction from the original difficulty. There is no guarantee at all that the new abstract problems were *adequately formulated* until their solutions are tested by the way in which the "improved" sign system functions in the resolution of the original concrete problematic situation. Yet the way one of these new abstract problems is formulated will influence the formulation and solution of others. To the extent that the formulation is inadequate, error will be added systematically to error.

The abstract problems solved under these conditions are pseudo-problems, because they could have been avoided had the earlier abstract solutions (and thus the formulations) been tested and found wanting in the original concrete difficulty. Until the recent liberation of mathematics from a necessary existential reference, mathematics never advanced very far ahead of the needs of physics. It is not likely that many of the amazing recent unapplied advances will ever be applied. At the same time there are unfulfilled mathematical needs in experimental physics. These gaps afford mathematicians who are willing, an opportunity to work on abstract sign problems as "pure" abstractions (i.e., without existential reference), but this work can be conducted *in view of the concrete* unresolved situations in physics which can serve as tests of the adequacy (for experimental inquiry) of the abstract sign solutions.

It might appear that semiotic does not separate its abstractions from the concrete material of the sciences. For this study includes the study (which Mr. Morris calls "semantics"[5]) of the relation

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 69. Mr. Carnap uses the same term, "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science," *ibid.*, p. 44. Mr. Morris is perhaps more wary of the fallacy than less instrumentalistic positivists. He includes in the study of semantics the correlation of signs with objects "and the analysis of the specific situations under which scientific terms and sentences are applicable." But if, as Dewey claims (*Logic*, pp. 68–70), each situation is unique, and as *felt* is also directive (i.e., necessary for judgments of "relevancy, weight or coherence of any designated distinction or relation"), then there can be no significant *experimental* test of unifying concepts except in experimental situations which require the concepts in question as instruments for resolution. That the issue here is far from merely verbal can be shown, I believe, by its bearing upon the possibility (considered later in the paper) of test-

between the scientific sign and its object. Certainly this relation is a significant reality. But it is not a primitive or a fixed datum. It does not exist independently of the total problematic situation in which it functions. The positivist seems to take "object" rather naïvely. Dewey has shown that "object" for science—taken as abstract or as *concrete*—emerges either within the problematic situation or else as a product of its resolution (and only tentatively even in the second case). Hence, even though the systematizer does not lose touch with the "objects" of science, these "objects" are themselves abstractions from the objective but felt difficulty upon which they are partially dependent for their meanings.

II

The social sciences fall within the purview of the Unity Movement. Now the fallacy of separated abstraction also occurs in these sciences in their orthodox forms. Their abstract material is often obtained from the concrete social institutions which they are presumably studying. But two factors operate to bring about the fallacy. One is the concern of these sciences to emulate physics by securing an imposing abstract material *without first* securing its operational significance in their concrete institutions. To make abstractions from a concrete situation is not the same thing as testing their relevance or adequacy within the situation. Thomas Aquinas was quite deft at the former, and could give some of our economists and sociologists an excellent run for their money.

Furthermore, there is an important and not very subtle distinction between (*a*) mere successful prediction as test of an "hypothesis" or theory and (*b*) the scientific resolution of concrete problematic situations. Conceivably one might become quite skillful at annihilating one's enemies by throwing spades at them. This would not prove the spade better than a spear as a weapon of offense or defense even if the person in question were more adept with it than with a spear. Even a spear would be of dubious advantage in a rapidly changing world if it blinded one to its limitations under certain new conditions of warfare. But it would be like a scientific idea if, under these new conditions, it helped one to discover improved modifications of itself, such as adaptation to a bow, or even better weapons of a different kind.

Doubtless the moral and social theories of Aquinas served in many successful predictions; e.g., about what would happen to the characters (if *not* the souls) of wayward mortals. Many of his ideas

ing moral ideals as scientific hypotheses by their success or failure in resolving social conflicts in situations where an aim actually operates for developing self-corrective techniques.

were much more relevant to the social conditions and problems of his time than some of our social theories are to our times and problems. Apparently, however, *none* of his ideas were amenable to a self-corrective method of inquiry. Among some of our social ideas which are in a sense relevant, an occasional successful *ad hoc* prediction, as logicians commonly recognize, has in itself no logical significance. Now the mere fact that these successful ideas can be made (or are made) implicative parts of a comprehensive abstract theory does not alone, from an experimental view-point, eliminate their *ad hoc* character. In order to have experimental logical significance they must be moments of a system which is not merely fruitful of further ideas and professional publications, but which aids continuous improvement of the ideas as they are used either in inquiry or in practice. Newtonian dogmatism was not exclusively a characteristic of Newtonian physicists considered in abstraction from the theory which they held. It apparently did not contain Einstein's principle of operational measurement which seems to be an important self-corrective procedure.

Accordingly, the abstract material of the social sciences, since in general it has not been tested operationally, is *at very best* merely potentially operational. Most of it does not even indicate a way in which it *might be* tested for self-correction. Add to these two considerations the fact that this material is split several different ways by incompatible theories, and it becomes clear that its "unification" with the other sciences would be a dubious blessing. Hence to expect a unification of operational disciplines from a symbolic unification of their systematic abstractions is not only to put the convoy ahead of the mine-sweepers, but furthermore it loads the convoys with material much of which could have been tested and found wanting before the voyage began. Thus in a second respect "metascience," the name Mr. Morris gives to the science of science,[6] in emulation of physics seems to make the mistake, avoided by physics, of starting at the abstract end.

III

The second factor which operates to bring unnecessary confusion in the social sciences is the assumption that they, as well as the nature sciences, are essentially neutral on questions involving ethical evaluations.

Now those concerned with the problem of evaluation who have seen their way to accepting seriously Dewey's claim of the "inherent universality of scientific method" can not afford to be caught

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

out on a fragile limb by insisting that scientific method is inherently neutral. Indeed, some of us should be trying to develop a clear, concrete meaning for the contrary hypothesis that experimental procedure can be ethically concerned.

If we examine this hypothesis carefully, we can see a possible remedy for the fallacy of separated abstraction in the social sciences and one which at the same time may serve as a basis for the unification of science. But to avoid the fallacy we shall look *first* for some concrete problematic situations which can afford operational tests of the adequacy of any abstractions involved in inquiry into them.

But in order to engage inquiry in concrete problematical social operations it is necessary at every step to make moral evaluations. Hence to secure an adequate logical basis for self-corrective social inquiry, we must follow out consistently the implications of a relativistic theory of evaluation and, at the same time, avoid the irrational consequences of ethical subjectivism. To avoid subjectivism we deny the ethical neutrality of science. Thus we obtain an ethical objective relativism, to be exploited and developed by self-corrective inquiry.

Fortunately we have more than a bare logical structure to go on. For some of our social agencies (largely governmental as yet) are trying in dead earnestness to develop *self-corrective* planning techniques by the *scientific use* of *all* relevant scientific knowledge available. More or less unintentionally these agencies are trying to bring the sciences together within concrete operations in material which affords plenty of problematic situations for the development of self-corrective techniques. If science is essentially self-corrective inquiry, we have here at our disposal activities which promise much for an operational unification of science without excluding the all-important problem of constructing workable and correctable evaluative methods. These activities would seem to promise consequences as revolutionary for prevailing concepts of knowledge as were those involved in Galileo's experimental forays into the shipyards.

In so far as these planning activities aim at the development of self-corrective techniques, they constitute *experimental* social science, however much the aim may be interfered with by immediate practical exigencies. This interference is logically secondary. In the development of the nature sciences many practical obstacles had to be dealt with over relatively long periods of time. Obviously such planning involves psychology, economics, and public administration. Actually it also involves the nature sciences. This inclusion within social science of all the sciences might be expected in any theory of emergent naturalism which takes the more complex

orders to be developments *of* and *within* the simpler orders rather than "externally added 'levels.'"[7]

The fact that *concretely* these other sciences are included in the attempts at experimental planning affords a significant opportunity. For these activities could be used deliberately as the moving, concrete, unifying front of all the sciences. They could serve as an actual operative testing ground for all the various abstract sign systems which will be involved in progressive unification. But unavoidably (and fortunately) they involve the problem of developing working ethical evaluative techniques, and they afford the occasion for formulating this problem on a self-corrective basis.

The pioneering activity of these governmental agencies goes on in the face of somewhat severe conditions which are far from flattering to a large part of contemporary philosophy; conditions which remind one sadly of the early development of the nature sciences in the face of the resistance made by the scholastic procedures prevalent then. By an analogy not as remote as might be wished they even occasionally suggest the inquisition. Thus philosophers who are willing can find a serious occupation in the task of scientific unification by clarifying for themselves and for others the revolutionary democratic and scientific problems and implications of concrete, participative, social planning in which these governmental agencies are engaged.

IV

To judge from the ideas of some of the men who have contributed to the *Encyclopedia,* it can not be said that the Movement quite takes sides on the question of the ethical neutrality of science. However, there is no doubt that the traditional position of logical positivism requires such neutrality. We have heard considerable about the scientific nonsense of ethical terms. And there are indications that this uncriticized assumption of the inherent ethical neutrality of science does operate in the Unity Movement. Mr. Milton B. Singer refers to the olive branch (not in these terms, of course) held out by the Movement to art, religion, and social valuation. Since they are parallel with science, they are safe from science.[8] Mr. Singer's apparent dualism of science and the prac-

[7] Cf. Dewey, "Social as a Category," *Monist,* Vol. XXXVIII (1928), pp. 161–177. Reprinted as "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea," *Philosophy and Civilization,* pp. 77–92; also in part as "The Social" in Ratner's selections, *Intelligence in the Modern World,* pp. 1059–1069. See also Ch. XXIV, "Social Inquiry," of Dewey's *Logic,* esp. pp. 491–492.

[8] Milton B. Singer, "Unity of Science Movement," *The Humanist,* Vol. I (Autumn, 1941), p. 105.

tical activities may be more decided than that of Mr. Morris to whom he refers. I can not be sure of the nature of Mr. Morris's sharp distinction between the science of an activity and a scientific activity.[9] The distinction is of obvious historical significance, but for the purpose of experimental logic I believe it is mainly verbal. This is not to deny a difference between scientific and unscientific activity. By definition the two are incompatible. But it does deny that the "use and enjoyment" aims of practice are necessarily incompatible with scientific aims in a given activity, even when the exigencies of practice make the former dominant.

In any case the assumption of the ethical concern of science as stated above involves that "scientific morality"(i.e., acting morally in a scientific way) is not separate from "a science of morality." How distinct from these "the study of the history of morality" may be involves questions which are beyond my competence to formulate briefly—if at all.

It is morally and logically significant that both Mortimer J. Adler (*Harpers*, Vol. 181, October, 1940, pp. 524ff, and in other papers) and Jacques Maritain (Ch. II of *Scholasticism and Politics*) exploit fully to the ends of Neo-thomism the positivistic separation of ethics and science. As Mr. Singer indicates,[10] the Vienna Circle is intimately connected with the origin and development of the Unity of Science Movement. Yet Maritain accepts almost literally the positivist interpretation of science, and can claim, with full logical justification and apparently with some empirical backing, that "the school of Vienna manifests no hostility toward religion, and certain representatives of this school . . . show a certain sympathy for the work of the theologians, whom they prefer to university philosophers" (*Ibid.*, p. 41). Insistence upon the inherent ethical neutrality of science is the main practical basis for insistence upon a supernaturalist morality.

Perhaps it is unnecessary to repeat here the familiar instrumentalist analysis of the basic practical and theoretical troubles with art, religion, and social valuation. Briefly it is that they have avoided, not the consequences of science indeed, but the universality inherent in scientific method by trying to remain "parallel with science." The same analysis claims that the trouble with our other institutions (science included) is the insistence by science that art, religion, and social valuation remain parallel with it. The logical basis for this position of science is the uncriticized assumption of many scientists and philosophers that scientific method is essentially neutral in regard to ethical evaluation. The chief practical

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

basis I can think of (which probably weighs less in logical minds, however timid they may be) is the unpleasantness or risk of taking a tentative but decisive stand (outside of professional journals) against certain deeply ingrained prejudices of the public.

But there is no justification for this assumption of the ethical neutrality of science, once an objective relativistic theory of ethics is accepted. "The purported dualism between science and value which Descartes and Bacon injected into the very idea of science may well have served an important need at the painful nativity of science when the then powerful church was the militant and jealous guardian of human values. But [with the recognition of the relativity of ethical standards] the perpetuation of this dualism is vicious. Scientists are no longer in danger of either Protestant or Catholic inquisition. There is a certain painful note of poetic justice in the contemporary fact that science, the institution, is in grave danger at the hands of the unscientifically conceived state—at the hands of the state conceived as a religious object or as a metaphysical entity.

"This dualism today serves only to increase the dangers to science. By means of it, the nature sciences can claim exemption from responsibility for the social consequences of their discoveries. By means of it, the social sciences, in envious emulation of the nature sciences, can claim exemption from responsibility for the same consequences. Both militantly demand a continuation of their freedom when, as a matter of fact, both are enslaved unknowingly by the industrial cultural patterns which blindly determine the prevailing research problems of the one and the pathetic academicism of the other. Freedom for science will be won only when it tries to determine its own direction by critical participation in these cultural forces. To do this science must accept responsibility for its own effects in society. When, rarely enough, the nature sciences become conscious of their neglect, they turn the task over to the social sciences, being careful to make a sharp theoretical distinction between social and nature studies. The social sciences, to remain science, that is, to remain ethically neutral, must then turn the job over to 'education' and proceed to laugh at the 'educators,' or to religion and proceed to undermine the church."[11] Thus the way is left open for the most brazen and ingenuous authoritarian agency to take over responsibility, whether it be Church or totalitarian state. For when the customary foundations of moral-social order are undermined beyond a certain point without resolution of crucial moral-social problems, dogmatic

[11] Horace S. Fries, "Idols or God?" *The Journal of Liberal Religion*, Vol. II (Autumn, 1941), p. 93.

authoritarian claims are welcomed as signs of divine guidance—as much by confused "intellectuals" as by "the masses."

One objection to introducing ethical concern into scientific method claims that to do so is to inject subjective considerations. Obviously the objection begs the question by assuming that no objective basis *can be discovered* for sound relative ethical evaluations. This assumption lacks historical justification; experimental science had to *discover* its objective bases and techniques. Neither has the assumption any logical justification other than the metaphysical presuppositions of either materialism or supernaturalism. Once ethical evaluations are taken as *tentative* and relative social plans, there is no theoretical reason why self-corrective techniques can not be evolved here as in the nature sciences by means of concrete tests afforded by the problematic situations involved in participative social planning. The chief practical reason why such techniques have not been developed on a wider scale is, as M. C. Otto suggests,[12] that we have not looked for them. The needs of non-participative social planning have already led to control of the "unification of science" in the dictatorships. Participative planning offers a scientific as well as a democratic alternative.[13]

HORACE S. FRIES.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

INTRINSIC GOOD

IN value-theory the main point of contention is the meaning of intrinsic goodness. But whatever goodness means philosophers should at least agree as to the meaning of intrinsic as applied to goodness. We find, however, that there is much disagreement about the meaning of intrinsic and as a consequence some definitions of goodness are ruled out because they fail to conform with some particular interpretation of the meaning of intrinsic which is applicable only to certain possible meanings of goodness. Stated vaguely, an intrinsic good is that which is good in itself. Now, whatever definition of goodness is finally accepted as correct, there must be a place for intrinsic goods, and the meaning of intrinsic, as applied to goods, should be the same in every meaning of good-

[12] M. C. Otto, *The Human Enterprise*, Ch. IV, "Truth and Ideals."

[13] My suggestion that we should look first to social problems to find a ground for the unification of the sciences is little more, it appears to me, than a specific development of Dewey's suggestion in his apparently neglected essay, "Unity of Science as a Social Problem," in the first number of the *Encyclopedia*.

ness. The meanings of goodness will differ, but the meaning of intrinsic should be the same. We propose to offer such a definition and to show some instances where the misuse of the meaning of intrinsic has led to confusion in value-theory. Although our point may be considered a minor one, its solution, if correct, will help eradicate a good deal of confusion and even some nonsense, too much of which is found in value-theory.

Professor W. D. Ross gives us a definition which is similar to the one which we shall offer: "The intrinsically good is best defined as that which is good apart from any of the results it produces."[1] But we find that Professor Ross forgets his definition soon after he makes it, and accepts, with slight changes the position of Professor G. E. Moore, a position which is very confusing because it involves two theses.

Moore's first thesis is the following:

> By calling one effect or set of effects *intrinsically better* than another it means that it is better in *itself*, quite apart from any accompaniments or further effects which it may have. That is to say: To assert of any one thing, A, that it is *intrinsically* better than another, B, is to assert that if A existed quite alone, without any accompaniments or effects whatever—if, in short, A constituted the whole Universe, it would be better that such a Universe should exist, than that a Universe which consisted solely of B should exist instead.[2]

And again:

> By saying that a thing is intrinsically good it means that it would be a good thing that the thing in question should exist, even if it existed *quite alone*, without any further accompaniments or effects whatever.[3]

Professor Moore has given us a second thesis which differs tremendously from the above.

> *To say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.*[4]

We propose to discuss these various assertions in order to establish a meaning for intrinsic good which is applicable to all theories of value.

[1] *The Right and the Good*, p. 68.

[2] *Ethics*, pp. 57–58.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 65. This definition would be satisfactory if we made the proper interpretation, an interpretation which I hope Professor Moore means. But we shall see that Professor Ross, who claims to be following Professor Moore, does strange things with this apparently harmless definition.

[4] *Philosophical Studies*, p. 260.

I. Intrinsic Good as Good Without Accompaniment

Professor Moore's first thesis is that intrinsic good is "that which would be good if it existed by itself alone."

A clue to Professor Moore's view can be obtained from the discovery of the nature of the things which he believes are intrinsically good. He argues that a good can not mean the same as an object of desire because it is often admitted that the thing in question is bad, whether it is desired or not. He extends this argument to cover all attitudes toward objects and concludes that the goodness or badness of an object does not depend upon someone's attitude toward it, even though it is true that wherever there is a good someone does have some attitude toward it.[5]

In the course of the argument Professor Moore says:

> The question we are now discussing is merely whether, granted that nothing can be intrinsically good unless it *contains* some feeling, a thing which *is* thus good and *does* contain this feeling cannot be good without anybody's needing to have *another* feeling towards *it*. The point may be simply illustrated by taking the case of pleasure. Let us suppose, for the moment, that nothing can be intrinsically good unless it contains some pleasure, and that every whole which contains more pleasure than pain is intrinsically good. The question we are now discussing is merely whether, supposing this to be so, any whole which did contain more pleasure than pain, *would* not be good, even if nobody had *any further feeling* towards it. It seems to me quite plain that it would be so. But if so, then, to say that a state of things is intrinsically good cannot possibly be the same thing as to say that anybody has any kind of feeling towards *it*, even though no state of things can be intrinsically good unless it *contains* some feeling towards *something*.[6]

Professor Moore is discussing the nature of intrinsic goodness rather than the nature of intrinsic, but it is important to analyze his argument because Professor Ross uses this argument as a basis for excluding relational theories of value on the grounds that if an *entity* has a relational property it can not exist by *itself alone* and hence can not be an intrinsic good.

Professor Moore has not distinguished a whole which *is* intrinsically good from a whole which *contains* an intrinsic good. If nothing is good unless someone is pleased with something, then we could say that the object which is being enjoyed is the intrinsic good. If we ask the question "is the whole—the enjoyment of the object—an intrinsic good?", then its goodness will depend upon whether or not anyone is pleased with that whole. But if no one is pleased with the whole, that whole still *contains* an intrinsic good. If, instead of calling the object the intrinsic good, we call the whole —the enjoyment of the object—an intrinsic good, then if it is held

[5] *Ethics*, pp. 157–169.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 167–168.

that nothing is intrinsically good unless someone is pleased with something, then the whole is intrinsically good because someone is pleased with something. And no one who maintains that nothing is good unless someone is pleased with something, need hold that the whole which is intrinsically good would not be an intrinsic good unless someone were pleased with that whole. From this it follows that to say that a state of things is intrinsically good can mean the same thing as to say that anybody has any kind of a feeling towards *it*. Here *it* refers not to the whole, but to the state of things towards which the feeling in question is directed.

Although we are not particularly concerned here with the meaning of goodness, we believe that Professor Moore has erred in his argument against the views of goodness which contain feelings as constituent parts of the meaning. Professor R. B. Perry points out that Professor Moore, in asserting that whatever is good may contain some feeling, is admitting the possibility that goodness may be defined in terms of that which is the object of that feeling, and not as a result of a superadded quality, "good."[7]

We are now in a position to understand Professor Ross's interpretation of *existing by itself alone*. We shall see that his attempt to exclude a relational definition of value on the grounds that such a view excludes the possibility of anything having intrinsic value is based on a faulty interpretation of *existing by itself alone*.

Professor Ross says:

> . . . if goodness is a relational quality (say = object of interest to some one), nothing could be good unless, besides it and its attribute of "being an object of interest to some one," something else existed, viz., a person to whom it is an object of interest. The essential difference would remain, that non-relational attributes can be possessed by subjects though nothing but the subjects and the attributes exist; while relational attributes can be possessed by subjects only if something besides both the subjects and the attributes exist, viz. the things that form the other terms of the relations. Thus if the definition of an intrinsic attribute as one which its subject would possess if nothing other than the subject existed, *be amended*[8] into the form "an intrinsic attribute is one which the subject would possess even if nothing but the subject and the attribute existed," it is evident that non-relational attributes are intrinsic and that relational attributes cannot be so. If "good," then, be defined as Professor Perry defines it, nothing can be intrinsically good.[9]

[7] *General Theory of Value*, p. 133, note.

[8] Italics ours—this amendment is probably due to Professor Perry: ". . . . according to the present view [Professor Perry's] any object unrelated to a subject cannot be good in itself any more than in Professor Moore's an object can be good in itself without possessing the specific superadded quality, good." *The General Theory of Value*, p. 133.

[9] Ross, *The Right and the Good*, p. 77.

Professor Ross sees that a quality does not "exist by itself alone"; he amends "by itself alone" to mean "with a subject"; he defines "an intrinsic attribute" as that which needs only a subject in order to exist: and he arrives at the stupendous conclusion that relational views have no room for intrinsic good. Instead of giving a crashing blow to relational theories, Professor Ross has left himself a victim for abuse. His reasoning is so faulty that one hesitates to criticize. Obviously by the same tactics, a proponent of the relational theory could do some amending of his own, and exclude the non-relational theories from having intrinsic value. But that is absurd. "Existing by itself alone" should mean "regardless of its consequences." In that case we would have a meaning of intrinsic which would apply to all theories of value. Professor Ross must have forgotten his previous definition: "The intrinsically good is best defined as that which is good apart from any of the results it produces."

Obviously, if value is relational, there must be at least two terms besides the relation, but *intrinsic*, defined so that it applies only to qualities, has nothing to do with *intrinsic* as applied to goodness, unless goodness is, as a matter of fact, a quality. Here we are anticipating what is to follow, since Professor Moore and Professor Ross have become confused over the notion of an intrinsic attribute. Intrinsic has come to mean two distinct things: "good in itself," and a special property of certain attributes.

II. Intrinsic Good as "Consequential—Attribute"[10]

When Professor Moore asserts:

To say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question,[11]

he believes that he is defining what is ordinarily meant when people speak of intrinsic good. But it appears to us that this is an elaborate extension of the concept which is usually expressed as "that which is good in itself." Since both Professors Moore and Ross believe that value theories are erroneous unless they contain this added notion, we must examine this meaning and the conclusions drawn from it.

Professor Moore elaborates:

When I say, with regard to any particular kind of value, that the question whether and in what degree anything possesses it *depends solely on the intrinsic*

[10] Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 79. "Now I agree that goodness is a consequential attribute; that anything that is good must be good either by virtue of its whole nature apart from its goodness, or by virtue of something in its nature other than its goodness."

[11] Mr. Moore's second thesis, as stated above.

> ***nature of the thing in question,*** I mean to say two different things at the same time. I mean to say (1) that it is ***impossible*** for what is strictly ***one and the same*** thing to possess that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and ***not*** to possess it at another; and equally ***impossible*** for it to possess it in one degree at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and to possess it in a different degree at another, or in a different set. . . . (2) The second part of what is meant is that if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything ***exactly like*** it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree.[12]

In connection with this we have three points to discuss: (1) Value as a "consequential attribute," as distinguished from an intrinsic property of a thing; (2) The connection between the above definition and theories of value; and, (3) Goodness as a synthetic or as an analytic property.

(1) Following Professor Moore and Professor Ross (who accepts Moore almost entirely), we find that the intrinsic properties of a thing are those properties which constitute an internal whole. Intrinsic properties give a complete description of the nature of the thing. Goodness is an attribute which need not be mentioned in giving a complete description because it is not an intrinsic property. It is a "consequential-attribute," a property by virtue of the intrinsic properties; it is synthetically implied. If we were to give a complete description of an apple which is intrinsically good, we would find that though goodness is a property of the apple, it is not an intrinsic property, but a property which is a consequent of the intrinsic properties. We may accept this distinction, and agree that if goodness is synthetically implied, it is not an intrinsic property, and it need not be mentioned in a complete description.

(2) This meaning of intrinsic property will help resolve the difficulty mentioned at the close of Section I: that is, the confusion between intrinsic attribute as "one which the subject would possess even if nothing but the subject and the attribute existed" and the nature of intrinsic goodness. Obviously, if intrinsic attribute, as used by Professor Ross in his attack on a relational view of intrinsic goodness, means the same as intrinsic property there is no more intrinsic good in Professor Ross's view than in a relational view, because goodness is in neither theory an intrinsic property. If Professor Ross means that intrinsic good can be properly defined only as a "consequential-attribute," then he can say that in a relational theory such as that of Professor Perry, there can be no *intrinsic* good because there has been no definition of goodness.

Rather than defining *intrinsic* as it is used in connection with goodness, Professors Moore and Ross are speaking of a property

[12] *Philosophical Studies,* pp. 260–261.

which they think belongs to goodness; they are not dismissing the theories because they have no meaning for intrinsic, but because they think the theories have not defined goodness. In short, they are dismissing all views which deny that value is a "consequential-attribute." And strangely enough, if goodness is a "consequential-attribute," we apparently have a peculiar relational theory, goodness being the referent of a curious necessary synthetic relation.

Professor Moore dismisses the two types of "naturalistic theories": the one relational, where a good is a state of being pleased; the other non-relational, where a good is a state of pleasure. In the former, pleasure is considered as an external property, and in the latter, as an intrinsic property.[13] He asserts:

> It seems to me equally obvious that *both* types of theory are false; but I do not know how to exclude them both except by saying that two different properties are both true of *goodness*, namely: (1) that it does depend *only* on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it—which excludes theories of the first type and (2) that, *though* this is so, it is yet not itself an intrinsic property—which excludes those of the second.[14]

But by the same stroke Professor Moore has rejected a number of unique theories. Professor W. Savery[15] has accepted the "uniqueness of good," but believes it to be an intrinsic property of pleasure. It seems to us, also, that if goodness were, as a matter of fact, a unique quality, it might well be an intrinsic property. Professor Moore can give us no evidence for his statement: "So far as I know, certain predicates of value are the only non-intrinsic properties which share with intrinsic properties this characteristic of depending only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them."[16] But we shall see that this dependence is quite different: on the one hand the dependence is analytic, tautologous; on the other hand synthetic. Further, the assertion that value, and value only, is "unique" in this respect casts a suspicion on the theory. One recalls, "everything must have a cause, except a First Cause."

It seems to be the case that Professors Moore and Ross are talking essentially about goodness, and not about the meaning of intrinsic as applied to goodness. They have failed to realize that there are two problems, quite distinct: the meaning of goodness on the one hand, and the meaning of intrinsic on the other. Although it is of extreme importance to value-theory to know whether or not goodness is a quality, this is, here, beside the point. According to our use of intrinsic, which we believe to be both the customary and

[13] *Philosophical Studies*, p. 272.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 273.

[15] "A Defense of Hedonism," *The International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XLV (1934), pp. 1–26.

[16] *Philosophical Studies*, p. 273.

important one, goodness can be intrinsic whether it is an intrinsic property, a relational property, a consequential property, or what not.

Hence, on this score, we can find no reason whatever to dismiss the two types of "naturalistic theories," nor the "unique" view which maintains that goodness is an intrinsic property.

(3) Further, we must take issue with Professors Moore and Ross concerning the nature of the necessary, yet non-logical, relation which is supposed to lie between the intrinsic nature of a thing and its value. This necessary non-logical relation has the flavor of the Kantian "synthetic-*a priori.*" If value were an intrinsic property of a thing, it would be necessary and analytic that a valuable thing possessed value, and we would know *a priori* that if a thing possessed value, then any other thing exactly like it would possess the same amount of value. This is a tautology. But Professors Moore and Ross assert that if two things are exactly alike, disregarding its value, then if one has value, the other will also have value, and in exactly the same degree. If this were true, it would follow that many relational theories of value are invalid. Now, since we believe that relational theories may be valid theories, and that two objects may be intrinsically alike, yet differ in value, we must show that Professor Moore's thesis is unsound.

If goodness were always an intrinsic property of *some property of a thing,* and if two things were exactly alike in all respects other than goodness, then if one had goodness, it would follow necessarily and analytically that the other would have goodness in exactly the same degree. If, for example, goodness were always an intrinsic property of pleasure, and if pleasure were an intrinsic property of the thing, and if the thing were to agree with another thing in all respects other than goodness, then if one thing had goodness it would follow necessarily and analytically that the other would have goodness in exactly the same degree. But if goodness were an intrinsic property of a thing, and if two things were exactly alike in all respects other than goodness, it does not follow necessarily and analytically that if one had goodness, the other would have goodness in exactly the same degree. If there were a "unique" goodness, it is logically possible that it should be either kind of an intrinsic property.

Professors Moore and Ross are not concerned with either possibility because they believe that goodness stands in a necessary synthetic relation to the intrinsic properties of a thing. Passing over the difficulties as to which intrinsic properties synthetically imply goodness, we come to this peculiar notion of synthetic necessity.

Professor Moore asserts:

That there is such a sense of necessity—a sense which entitles us to say that what has F *would* have G, even if causal laws were quite different from what they are—is, I think, quite clear from such instances as the following. Suppose you take a particular colour, which is yellow. We can, I think, say with certainty that any patch exactly like that one, *would* be yellow, even if it existed in a Universe in which causal laws were quite different from what they are in this one. We can say that any such patch *must* be yellow, quite unconditionally, whatever the circumstances, and whatever the causal laws. And it is in a sense similar to this, in respect of the fact that it is neither empirical nor causal, that I mean the "must" to be understood, when I say that if a kind of value is to be "intrinsic" then, supposing a given thing possesses it in a certain degree, anything exactly like that thing *must* possess it in exactly the same degree. To say, of "beauty" or "goodness" that they are "intrinsic" is only, therefore, to say that this thing which is obviously true of "yellowness" and "blueness" and "redness" is true of them.[17]

Now, Professor Moore can not have meant exactly this, for he is quite urgent in stating that properties such as yellowness and blueness are "intrinsic" properties, while goodness is not, but shares "with intrinsic properties the characteristics of depending solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it."[18] But this dependence is not the same: with the "intrinsic" properties it is analytic, with goodness it is synthetic.

Professor Moore's confusion can be traced to the following:

I do not see how it can be deduced from any logical law that, if a given patch of colour be yellow, then any patch which were exactly like the first would be yellow too. And similarly in our case of "intrinsic" value, though I think it is true that beauty, for instance, is "intrinsic," I do not see how it can be deduced from any logical law, that if *A* is beautiful, anything that were exactly like *A* would be beautiful too, in exactly the same degree.[19]

But it is obvious that this first example involves a tautology. If we have a patch of color, A, which is exactly like a patch, A', then any character which A has, will be possessed by A', otherwise they will not be exactly alike. And if the case with "value" is similar to the case with color, then X, which has value, and X', which is exactly like X, would have exactly the same amount of value, for otherwise they would not be exactly alike. This is also a tautology.

But Professor Moore has made the added distinction that while yellow, for example, is an intrinsic property of a thing, value is not, but is a consequence of the intrinsic nature of a thing. Now, if we consider the intrinsic nature of a thing together with those properties which are necessary consequences of it as the complete nature of the thing, then it will follow necessarily and logically that if one thing has value anything *exactly like it* will also have value, and in exactly the same degree. Even though the relation between

[17] *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 268–269.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 273.

[19] *Philosophical Studies*, p. 272.

a thing and its value is synthetic, it follows logically that if one thing has value anything *exactly like it* has the same amount of value. But that which is important here is the necessary synthetic relation.

Professor Ross rectifies Professor Moore's error in the first of the two points:

> Two patches of colour exactly alike in these other respects [colour tone, brightness, size, shape] must be alike in beauty. In other words, while these others are constitutive characteristics, beauty is, in some way, . . . a dependent or consequential characteristic. *The necessity that if the intrinsic nature of the two patches is the same their colour (or brightness, or size, or shape) must be the same is analytic;* [20] the necessity that their degree of beauty must be the same is synthetic.[21]

If the relation between a thing and its value is always synthetic, it follows logically that the relation between any other thing and its value is also synthetic. But what evidence is there for the assertion that there is a necessary synthetic relation between a thing and its value? Professor Moore and Professor Ross have given us no evidence whatsoever. It seems that they have fallen into the same error as those who assert that there is a necessary synthetic relation between cause and effect. And so far as the latter is concerned the probability is that there is no necessary relation at all, indeed, it may even be the case that a necessary synthetic relation is a contradiction.

At any rate, it is undoubtedly true that neither Professor Moore nor Professor Ross are talking about the meaning of intrinsic as it is ordinarily used in connection with value theory. They have given no evidence in their attempt to show that goodness has those properties which they assert it to have. They have not shown that goodness is a quality, nor that it can be nothing else; they have not shown that it is a result of a necessary synthetic relation; and they have not shown that it is neither an intrinsic nor a relational property. Professor Moore's confusion may have arisen as a result of the thought which he expressed later in his excellent article on "Internal and External Relations." The notion of "intrinsic" as applied to properties is far afield from intrinsic as applied to value. We are unable to account for Professor Moore's usage of necessity unless it be the Englishman's conviction that value must have a solid basis, a basis more solid than mere empirical fact.

Although, in connection with Professor Ross, we think it admirable that a member of the Oxford School should follow the Cambridge School, it is amusing to note that on one of the too few oc-

[20] Italics ours.

[21] Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 120. Cf. p. 119.

casions that such an event has occurred, the Cambridge model was wrong.

III. Intrinsic Good as Excluding "Acquired" Good

Professor Perry has given us a meaning of intrinsic in connection with his theory of value which is also inadequate. He claims that an intrinsic good is an "object desired for itself" and that an object desired for something else is an extrinsic good.[22] This use of intrinsic and extrinsic may lead one to believe that value is even for Professor Perry an object of a qualified interest and further, we would have no place for the extrinsic goods which are means to intrinsic goods and which do not happen to be objects of interest. If Professor Perry had made use of the concepts of "original" good and "acquired" good he could have avoided this trouble.

If there is an object, *A*, which possesses the property, goodness, and if there is an object, *B*, which is a cause or part of the cause of *A*, then if *B* acquires the property, goodness, as a result of the knowledge of this relation to *A*, we shall call *B* an "acquired" good and *A* an "original" good. Now, in Professor Perry's view, if *A* is an object of interest, and if *B* becomes an object of interest as a result of our knowledge of its relation to *A*, both *A* and *B* would be objects of interest and both would be intrinsic goods. As long as *B* is an object of a positive interest it is an intrinsic value regardless of the actual consequences of *B*. Professor Perry's limited use of intrinsic and extrinsic is not serious but we believe that our amended use is preferable because it means that we can have a meaning for intrinsic and extrinsic that is applicable to any theory of value. "Acquired" goods should be included with the intrinsic goods.

If we accept the definition of intrinsic good as that which is good regardless of its consequences, we have a definition of intrinsic good ("that which would be good even if it existed by itself alone") which is applicable to any sound theory of value. If we mean by an extrinsic good, a cause or a part of the cause of an intrinsic good (understanding that an extrinsic good may, as a matter of fact, sometimes be an intrinsic good, and that an intrinsic good may also be an extrinsic good), we will have two definitions, applicable to all theories of value, which will avoid errors such as we find in Professors Moore and Ross and will avoid possible misunderstandings which might arise in connection with the interest theory of Professor Perry.

Barnett Savery.

University of Idaho.

[22] *General Theory of Value*, pp. 131–134.

BOOK REVIEW

Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism. CHARLES HARTSHORNE. Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark & Co. 1941. xix + 360 pp. $3.00.

This closely-reasoned theological essay can be regarded from at least three aspects—as a general justification of theism, as an argument for one version of theism, and as a critique of some traditional theistic dogmas. The dominant theological conception of God as absolutely simple, purely active, non-temporal, non-emotional, and all in all absolutely perfect, Hartshorne considers metaphysically erroneous and irreligious in its implications. In elaborate development of certain strains characterizing recent neo-Protestant and panpsychistic theology he offers a conception of God as perfectible, temporal, partly passive, and suffering. God's essential trait is love. By affirming "the necessity of a division of powers, hence of responsibilities, as binding even upon a maximal power" (p. 30), Hartshorne copes with the problem of evil. The view that God's goodness and perfection are wholly unaffected by the good or evil in the world he condemns as profoundly immoral, as sophistically implying that "really there [is] to be no service of God, but only a service of men through the—to them—beneficial practices of religion" (p. 48), that evil as well as good contributes to the glory of God.

Hartshorne's theism entails a greater than ordinary amount of anthropomorphism. But he willingly embraces this, maintaining that the concept of God can not be given significant content except in terms of human and social analogy. The world is God's body. He is the supreme mind and force of the cosmic organism, a view the author calls "panentheism." Panpsychism is central to the argument, and from its assumption follow many judgments concerning the properties of deity. The assumption of deity in turn is taken to support the conclusion of panpsychism.

In its critical capacity, delineating the more subtle contradictions, vaguenesses, and non sequiturs of traditional theology, this book excels. If Hartshorne's own rationalism were as free from difficulties as such a judgment might suggest, the same could be said of the book as a whole. But a number of considerations suggest otherwise.

(1) A distinction is repeatedly made between concepts genuinely "religious" and concepts "irreligious." What criterion underlies this distinction—unless it be frankly personal intuition, —as well as the distinction between ideas "religious" and "secular," is mysterious. It is certainly not a historical one, for the

usage and procedure of historical orthodoxy are precisely what Hartshorne attacks.

(2) The emphasis on the religious-secular distinction, along with other considerations, reflects a potent will-to-believe influence in the formation of Hartshorne's conclusions. This in itself is not the point, but rather Hartshorne's apparent unawareness of its influence in determining his metaphysical and moral preferences. Sometimes this influence comes to the surface: "At this I for one can not do other than say no! Give me some other God or none. The whole point of religion is destroyed" (p. 117). A familiar note indeed, but Hartshorne's failure to make explicit this factor in his methodology favorably accentuates the critical self-consciousness of Kant and James.

(3) There is a pronounced tendency in this book to turn controversial matters into obvious facts. Thus Hartshorne takes the idea of greater and less in value to be one "than which none could be more elementary in philosophy" (p. 18). Were this true with respect to ordinary issues, it would still be fantastic to affirm it as Hartshorne does in connection with the meanings of "deity" and "perfection." Elsewhere we discover another alleged commonplace: "The notion that physical pleasure is enjoyed by the bodily cells, and participated in by us, is not a mere hypothesis, to be indirectly verified, but, like all philosophical ideas, is a hypothetical description of the immediately given" (p. 152).

(4) Some of the arguments for panpsychism (required for the conception of cosmic organism) illustrate the *a priorism* that remains the bane of philosophy. If God is essentially love, Hartshorne reasons, nothing "can be incapable of being loved"; but "dead matter" would have to be incapable of being loved (p. 205). Or consider this: The assumption of God requires the assumption of maximum beauty in the universe. Now "there must be a balance of likeness and difference, of similarity and contrast, if there is to be beauty" (p. 212). But "a contrast as this between the living and the dead, that which has feeling and that which has none, is not beautiful" (p. 214). Ergo, panpsychism.

(5) If the world is God's body, and God is love, it follows that any possible object of God's love is a part of his body. None of the author's dialectical refinements (and there are many) seem to abolish this conclusion. It may be, of course, that he does not regard it as awkward or "irreligious," for he does not even state it in this way. But that it is discordant with the poetic fervor of his theory of divine love is clear, and especially clear when we recall his view that ideas of deity can be given meaning for us only in terms of human analogy.

(6) In a discussion of the bearing which the present war has upon the religious ideal of love, Hartshorne concludes that love necessarily implies social realism and social awareness. In this way he not only feels able to explain divine specialization of sympathy but condemns dogmatic pacifism. The independent logic of Hartshorne's theism is here admirably reflected. But it goes hand in hand with the customary appeal to authority, and his attempt to harmonize this theory of love with the intent of Jesus meets with the customary embarrassment. The injunction to "resist not evil" (Matthew) is not, like an ecclesiastical or philosophical dogma, transformed by a resolution to avoid "literal absolutism" (p. 171).

Hartshorne considers his rationalism scientific, as do rationalists in every age and clime. Those who share his methodological temper and agree upon the first principles he thinks are first will be impressed by the meaty texture of his discussion, especially perhaps by a revivified ontological argument stated as strongly as that argument can be. Those who can not accept theism or his version of it will be more impressed by the sincerity and religious feeling that prevail throughout.

JUSTUS BUCHLER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

BOOK NOTES

Filosofía de la historia. IMMANUEL KANT. Prólogo y Tr. de Eugenio Imaz. México: El Colegio de México. 1941. 147 pp.

Under the above title are collected and translated into Spanish the following essays from Kant's *Gesammelte Schriften* (edited by P. Gedan, W. Kinkel, etc.): (I) *What is the Enlightenment?* (1784); (II) *Idea of a Universal History* (1784); (III) *The Probable Beginnings of Human History* (1786); (IV) "Whether Humanity is in Constant Progress towards the Better," included in *The Dispute of Faculties* (1789); (V) *The End of all Things* (1794). Although the famous work on *Eternal Peace* (1795) fits the topic of this volume, it was omitted intentionally because it is "already very well known in the Spanish language." It is an intellectual shame that not all of the foregoing selections have been translated into English, let alone the crucial question as to their being "well known."

The criterion which guided the translator, Señor Imaz, in publishing these papers is stated clearly in his *Prologue:* Kant's philosophy of history is a "fundamental aspect" of his thought. Heine was wrong in showing surprise on meeting with *The Critique*

of Practical Reason after his "dithyrambic reading" of *The Critique of Pure Reason.* What really would be surprising is that any philosopher like Kant should talk seriously about metaphysics and epistemology, and chatter about politics and history. Even the philosopher "on the hyperborean islet of Koenigsberg" had to show, after all, some enthusiasm over the French Revolution!

According to Kant, Rousseau is "the Newton of the moral world." And, according to the translator, Rousseau is the greater Newton in Kant's eyes, because the former's material of philosophical analysis is not the fact of science, but that of morality. Hume's scepticism awakened Kant not only from "the dogmatic slumbers" of rationalism, but, strictly speaking, from *"cientismo,"* which puts science first, via Rousseau. Hence the conclusion: "the true Kantian revolution is the Rousseauan, a second and penetrating edition of Rousseau's." In spite of all this appealing argument, the Secret of Kant is still a big secret to this day.

Strange as it may sound, Kant at eighty dies prematurely, Señor Imaz laments. Kant's ambition, he insists, was to synthesize the three *Critiques* into what later came to be called a *Critique of Historical Reason.* In various passages of the selected writings of this volume, one can anticipate his goal in the search for "historical reason, the *a priori* laws of the historical world," and the search for the categories which make history intelligible and controllable.

Among the posthumous works there is a sketch of *A System of Philosophy in Totality,* which Kant considered, it is alleged, his *magnum opus.* However, the translator admits that he does not know this work. Moreover, he is aware of the prejudiced attitude against it on the part of critics, especially Kuno Fischer. Prejudice for prejudice, he naturally prefers his own, to wit, "that if Rousseau is the Newton of the moral world, Kant would have wanted to be the Newton of the historical world."

P. R.

The Organization of Knowledge. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. GLENN NEGLEY. New York: Prentice-Hall. 1942. xvi + 373 pp. $3.00.

This book aims to provide a systematic plan for the organization of knowledge, a plan, moreover, which is to be fruitful for the purposes of action. The first of the three parts of the book examines the nature of analysis. Analysis is said to be the recognition and the description of the various points of view which can be taken in the process of thinking about a problematic situation. Three

such points of view are distinguished: the individual, which bears on the purposes involved in a problematic situation; the material, which is concerned with the factors that can implement or hinder the realization of these purposes; and the formal, which notes the systematic patterns that emerge in the settlement of problematic situations. Within each point of view three further sub-divisions are introduced, so that nine distinctions or categories finally appear. The second part of the book is devoted to analysis and the sciences, and examines the mutual relations of those categories which are cognate. The various special sciences are thus assigned a place within this framework of relations. The third part of the book makes a survey of fallacies in analysis, in particular those occurring in observation, inference, and prediction. Finally, three appendices offer some "experiments in analysis; the "experiments" are expositions with commentary of three types of social theory: the individualism of Bentham, the corporatism of E. Jordan, and the legal formalism of Austin.

Only the first two parts of the book are clearly relevant to its professed aim; and what is remarkable about them is that they consume 207 pages in formulating an obvious scheme of classification. A few of the fallacies cited in the third part of the book are amusing; but the discussion never rises above an elementary level. There is more substance in the appendices than elsewhere in the volume; in any event, it is not evident to this reviewer what the book contributes either to philosophical analysis or to the organization of knowledge.

E. N.

OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

Roback, A. A.: Psychorama. A Mental Outlook and Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: Sci-Art Publishers. 1942. 365 pp. $2.90.

Riviere, William T.: A Pastor Looks at Kierkegaard. The Man and His Philosophy. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing House. 1941. 231 pp. $1.50.

Mahler, Raphael: Jewish Emancipation. A Selection of Documents. (Pamphlet Series. Jews and the Post-War World. Number 1.) New York: Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems of the American Jewish Committee. 1941. 54 pp.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH. Volume II, Number 3. Symposium on the Significance of Max Scheler for Philosophy and Social Science. Introductory Statement: *G. N. Shuster.* Scheler's Theory of Sympathy and Love: *V. J. McGill.* The Meaning of Objectivism and Realism in Max Scheler's Phi-

losophy of Religion: A Contribution to the Understanding of Max Scheler's Catholic Period: *Hanna Hafkesbrink.* Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge: *Howard Becker* and *H. O. Dahlke.* Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego: *Alfred Schuetz.* Scheler's Contributions to the Sociology of Affective Action, with Special Attention to the Problem of Shame: *R. H. Williams.* The Grounds of Knowledge: *Isabel Stearns.* Russell's Quest for Objectivity: *A. E. Avey.* The Conception of Possibility in Meinong's "Gegenstandstheorie: *A. L. Michaelis.* Discussion—The Problems of Empirical Metaphysics: *Thornton Read.* In Reply to Mr. Read: *John Wild.*

NOTES AND NEWS

Professor Wilmon H. Sheldon of Yale University has been appointed by Columbia University to be the first lecturer on the Woodbridge Memorial Foundation. He will deliver five lectures in April, 1943, on the subject "Process and Polarity."

Professor Wm. Pepperell Montague of Columbia University will deliver the Annual Felix Adler Lecture on Sunday, May 3rd, 1942, at the Meeting House of the New York Society for Ethical Culture. The title of the lecture is "A Three-Fold Philosophy of Government."

We print below the program of the Forty-third Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, to be held at the University of Wisconsin, April 23, 24, and 25, 1942.

THURSDAY, APRIL 23

2:00 P.M. Concurrent Session (A). Social Philosophy.

An Operational Approach to the Subject of Justice: *E. H. Garlan.*
Discussion: *F. C. Sharp.*

The Sources of Fichte's *Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat*: *E. L. Schaub.*
Discussion: *D. S. Robinson.*

A Defense of Human Equality: *Herbert Spiegelberg.*
Discussion: *Ethel Tilley.*

2:00 P.M. Concurrent Session (B). Value Theory.

Paralogisms of the Free-Will Problem: *S. S. S. Brown.*
Discussion: *D. D. Williams.*

Temperament and Moral Theory: *A. W. Levi.*
Discussion: *C. W. Morris.*

Consciousness and Value: *P. B. Rice.*
Discussion: *H. N. Wieman.*

2:00 P.M. Concurrent Session (C). Esthetics.

Autonomous Form as Absolute Beauty: *John S. Marshall.*
Discussion: *Paul Henle.*

Reality and Unreality in Art: *Walter Cerf.*
Discussion: *Bertram Morris.*

Three Relations of Facts and Values: *Ray Lepley.*
Discussion: *L. E. Hahn.*

7:30 P.M. Smoker and informal forum on the Role of Philosophy in Higher Education.

The Training of Teachers of Philosophy: *Max Black.*

Report of the Subcommittee on the Teaching of Philosophy: *D. S. Robinson* and *W. H. Hill.*

FRIDAY, APRIL 24

9:15 A.M. Concurrent Session (A). Metaphysics.

The Process of Sensation in Plotinus: *G. H. Clark.*
Discussion: *Roger Hazelton.*

Aristotle's Presuppositions about Change: *George Boas.*
Discussion: *P. R. Anderson.*

Scientific Method and the Concept of Emergence: *A. C. Garnett.*
Discussion: *H. H. Titus.*

9:15 A.M. Concurrent Session (B). Epistemology.

Knowledge as Knowledge and as Social Fact: *E. W. Hall.*
Discussion: *A. H. Johnson.*

Experience as Given: *Edith W. Schipper.*
Discussion: *Lawrence Sears.*

Is There a Problem of Induction?: *F. L. Will.*
Discussion: *R. L. Rein'l.*

9:15 A.M. Concurrent Session (C). Logic.

The Definition of Definition: *Lionel Ruby.*
Discussion: *A. C. Benjamin.*

Premises for Action: *H. D. Roelofs.*
Discussion: *Herbert Feigl.*

The Indexical and the Presentative Functions of Signs: *Willis Moore.*
Discussion: *Gustav Bergmann.*

2:00 P.M. General Session in Honor of William James.

Remembering William James: *H. M. Kallen.*

Jamesian Psychology and the Stream of Psychological Thought: *J. R. Kantor.*

William James' Pluralistic Metaphysics of Experience: *Victor Lowe.*

The Place of William James within the Pragmatic Movement: *Charles Morris.*

4:30 P.M. Public Lecture: "The Crisis in Civilization" by *Marten ten Hoor.*

6:45 P.M. Annual Dinner. Presidential Address, "Concerning Philosophy" by *E. Jordan.*

SATURDAY, APRIL 25

9:15 A.M. General Session and Panel on the Philosopher's Function in Time of War.

An Account and Interpretation of the Questionnaire on Philosophy and the War: *V. C. Aldrich.*
Discussion: *Eliseo Vivas* and *A. R. King.*
General Discussion.

11:15 A.M. Annual Business Meeting.

The Eleventh Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences, to be held at the New School for Social Research on May 3, 1942, will be devoted to the topic "Method and Belief." Papers on "Is There a Tenable Defense of Pacifism?" will be read at the morning session by Professors Paul Weiss, Justin W. Nixon, and Felix Kaufmann. In the afternoon session, the issue to be discussed is "Validity in Religion." Professor Paul Tillich will present a paper on "The Appeal to Revelation"; Dr. Howard H. Brinton will speak on "The Appeal to Mysticism," and Professor Douglas C. Macintosh will discuss "The Method of Religious Inquiry." Discussion from the floor will follow each session.